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the new PRotectoRs of Rio: globAl finAnce 
And the sustAinAble develoPment AgendA
by Ariel Meyerstein*
InTroduCTIon
In this twentieth anniversary year of the Rio Earth Summit of 1992,1 the United Nations is hosting a Conference on Sustainable Development (“Rio +20”). As a supplement to 
Rio+20, the U.N. Global Compact will organize the Rio+20 Cor-
porate Sustainability Forum in cooperation with the Rio+20 Sec-
retariat, the UN System, and the Global Compact Local Network 
Brazil.2 The Corporate Sustainability Forum is a prime example 
of contemporary global governance — what some have termed 
transnational “new governance”3 — in that it will be a multi-
stakeholder affair sponsored by international organizations, 
transnational corporations, and NGOs. As such, the Corporate 
Sustainability Forum is a fitting addition to Rio+20, since much 
of the sustainability agenda since the 1992 Earth Summit has 
been driven by interactions with the private sector and, as this 
Article will describe, much of its future rests in the hands of the 
private sector — particularly with global financial institutions.
aFTer rIo: The revolT agaInsT  
“bIg developmenT” and The rIse oF prIvaTe 
developmenT FInanCe
Since its earliest formulations, a tension has resided at 
the heart of the concept of sustainable development between 
the need of developing countries for economic growth and 
the simultaneous advancement of increasingly progressive 
approaches (through the development of international environ-
mental law) to constraining the negative impacts of industrial 
development on the environment and society. When the United 
Nations’ General Assembly called for what would become the 
Rio Earth Summit, it described it as a conference on the “envi-
ronment and development.”4 The Earth Summit was intended 
to advance “ international environmental law, taking into 
account the Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human 
Environment, as well as the special needs and concerns of the 
developing countries.”5 These special needs and concerns were 
the worries that newly established international environmental 
law and policy would create trade restrictions that would be 
prioritized over poverty reduction efforts.6
For decades before the Earth Summit, development policy 
was dominated by exogenous growth theory,7 which led the 
World Bank Group’s International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (“IBRD”) to focus nearly forty percent of its 
lending activity on large infrastructure projects.8 Since at least 
the 1970’s, however, local and transnational civil society groups 
have protested the adverse impacts some large projects have 
had on local populations and ecosystems, including the forceful 
dislocation of politically marginalized, often indigenous people 
from their homes, ancestral lands and way of life, and in some 
instances threatening to destroy irreplaceable cultural sites, 
unique habitats or species.9 Such “problem projects” often result 
from the incapacity of the regulatory systems in project host 
countries to properly assess environmental and social impacts 
and enforce compliance with national and international laws.10 
According to United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Navi Pillay, “many of the estimated 370 million indig-
enous peoples around the world have lost, or are under imminent 
threat of losing, their ancestral lands, territories and natural 
resources because of unfair and unjust exploitation for the sake 
of ‘development.’”11 Problem projects can also be found at the 
epicenters of many national and international conflicts throughout 
the world, some of them violent.12
The IBRD’s fetish for large project financing continued with 
intensity until a few years after the Earth Summit, when such 
lending declined sharply to less than thirty percent of the IBRD’s 
total lending.13 This departure from the scene was mirrored by 
a drastic decline in other official sources of aid to governments, 
which dropped 40% between 1991 and 1997.14 The decline in 
public development finance has been attributed to the emer-
gence of a global market for private investment in infrastructure 
spurred by the privatization and deregulation of many industrial 
sectors, as well as the continued globalization of financial mar-
kets through the harmonization of tax regimes and the lowering 
of restrictions on foreign capital.15 Although these changes to 
global markets were likely the main force behind the IBRD’s 
partial (and temporary) retreat from infrastructure lending, 
another significant contributing factor was the substantial repu-
tational costs that had been imposed on the bank by its history of 
developing infrastructure projects in an unsustainable fashion.16
By the mid-1990s, civil society demands led to the 
creation of accountability mechanisms and continually evolv-
ing social and environmental risk review policies within the 
multilateral development banks, specifically the World Bank’s 
Inspection Panel.17 As the World Bank’s private lending arm, 
the International Financial Corporation (“IFC”), picked-up the 
IBRD’s slack in financing large projects (often in syndicates 
along with commercial lenders), it too saw a backlash of civil 
society protest that gave way to an accountability mechanism 
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— the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman — and a host of 
continually updated environmental and social policies.18 These 
mechanisms have provided some limited means for affected 
communities to have project approval processes reviewed, but 
the mechanisms have been criticized for not truly protecting 
project-affected populations from undue harm.19
Despite these advancements at multilateral development 
institutions, at the turn of the new millennium there remained 
a gap between the level of scrutiny applied to project finance 
transactions by development banks and the processes (or lack 
thereof) for environmental and social risk review deployed by 
commercial banks. With this gap in mind, civil society groups 
sought to build on their accomplishments vis-à-vis multilateral 
development banks and focus on private financiers of large 
development projects.20 NGOs launched a series of public 
advocacy campaigns directed at the leading commercial lend-
ing institutions, all of which were invested to varying degrees in 
problem projects.21
At the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2003, 
a coalition of NGOs launched the Collevecchio Declaration on 
Financial Institutions and Sustainability.22 The Collevecchio 
Declaration recognized the “role and responsibility” of financial 
institutions (“FIs”) in globalization, stating that FIs are “chan-
neling financial flows, creating financial markets and influencing 
international policies in ways that are too often unaccountable 
to citizens, and harmful to the environment, human rights, and 
social equity,” and called on them to “promote the restoration 
and protection of the environment, and promote universal human 
rights and social justice,” which principles “should be inher-
ent in the way that they offer financial products and services, 
and conduct their businesses.”23 The Collevecchio Declaration 
remains the benchmark against which civil society actors 
measure multilateral and private financial activity.24
A core group of four banks who had been subject to 
aggressive public advocacy campaigns before the Collevecchio 
Declaration already formed a working group in late 2002 to 
explore the creation of an industry standard for environmental 
and social risk management procedures.25 The group decided to 
base their new framework on the IFC’s Performance Standards 
because of the utility of having one global standard applicable 
throughout the entire project finance industry.26 After further 
refinement, on June 4, 2003, the senior executives of ten com-
mercial banks met at the IFC in Washington, D.C and formally 
adopted the “Equator Principles” (“EPs”).27 The goal, as the 
name suggests, was to “level the playing field” by establishing 
one standard of project review that would apply globally, i.e., on 
both sides of the Equator.
The Equator Principles’ Preamble states that they were 
adopted “in order to ensure that the projects we finance are 
developed in a manner that is socially responsible and reflect 
sound environmental management practices.”28 Accordingly, 
the Preamble declares that “negative impacts on project affected 
ecosystems and communities should be avoided where possible, 
and if these impacts are unavoidable, they should be reduced, 
mitigated and/or compensated for appropriately.”29 Significantly, 
the banks were never coy about the mutual benefits of this 
approach, i.e., their faith in the “business case” for sustainability, 
noting further in the Preamble that “[w]e believe that adoption 
of and adherence to these Principles offers significant benefits 
to ourselves, our borrowers and local stakeholders through our 
borrowers’ engagement with locally affected communities.”30 
The Preamble then hints at the potential for such regimes: “[w]e 
therefore recognise that our role as financiers affords us oppor-
tunities to promote responsible environmental stewardship and 
socially responsible development.”31
The regime has grown from ten initial founding members 
with about thirty percent of the global market share32 to seventy-
six institutions from over thirty countries.33 The EPFIs claim 
that over seventy percent of all emerging market project finance 
transactions are covered by the EPs.34 The EPFIs’ ranks include 
commercial banks, export credit agencies, and development 
finance institutions.35 As much as the EPs have grown to become 
an industry standard, they have thus far not deeply penetrated 
institutions in key emerging markets where a tremendous 
amount of project finance and some of the largest individual 
deals. Thus, while the EPs have expanded tremendously in their 
eight years of existence, the global playing field still has some 
uneven patches on it, and those patches are where a significant 
amount of development is taking place and where some of the 
most vulnerable populations reside. Although the global spread 
of the EPs is a significant measure of their utility as a regime, 
others have theorized about what specific attributes of a regime 
are necessary conditions for effective governance, which this 
article explores below.
The equaTor prInCIples as a  
“TransnaTIonal ‘new governanCe’”
defining tRAnsnAtionAl “new goveRnAnce”
The transnational civil society movement that encouraged 
institutional change at the World Bank simultaneously led to 
the creation of the World Commission on Dams (“WCD”), 
which was brokered between the World Bank and the World 
Conservation Union (“IUCN”). The WCD is perhaps underap-
preciated now for what it was: among the very first examples of 
multi-stakeholder global governance,36 a transnational merging 
of the governmental, civil society, and private sectors, though a 
decade later it had already become more commonplace.37 The 
broader contribution of the WCD, some have argued, was its role 
as an agent of normative change, as it proposed that infrastructure 
decision making should be a procedurally dense process imbued 
with “a “[human] rights and risks” perspective organized around 
“disclosure, consultation, and dialogue.”38 These concepts have 
informed the development of the development finance institu-
tions’ approaches to project review and risk mitigation and are at 
the core of the EPs, although not yet as robustly as they could be, 
in the views of the EPs’ key NGO interlocutors.39
Twenty years later, the phenomenon that began with the 
WCD has gone “viral.” The diverse regulatory phenomena that 
have emerged in response to global regulatory gaps have been 
typologized as transnational “new governance”40 and “civil 
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regulation” or “private regulation.”41 They are direct public and 
private responses to a series of missed opportunities by State 
actors to collectively create effective regimes of global interna-
tional business regulation. For example, the Forest Stewardship 
Council emerged directly out of the frustration by environmental 
groups at what they considered to be the complete failure of gov-
ernments at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit to conclude a binding 
international treaty on forestry issues.42
What has resulted, however, is a “new global public domain” 
that does not “replace states” so much as “embed systems of 
governance in broader global frameworks of social capacity and 
agency that did not previously exist.”43 As political scientists 
Kenneth Abbott44 and Duncan Snidal45 have argued, these new 
arrangements of regulatory power constitute the emergence of 
a complex “governance triangle,”46 in which international stan-
dards are now created, implemented, monitored, and enforced 
by varying combinations of states, firms, and NGOs seeking to 
transform whole supply chains and global networks of operations 
spanning multiple jurisdictions.47 There are now over 300 such 
initiatives attempting to introduce governance into nearly every 
major global economic sector, including energy, the extractive 
industries, forestry, chemicals, textiles, apparel, footwear, sport-
ing goods, coffee, and cocoa.48
goveRnAnce effectiveness And comPetencies
But how are we to measure the effectiveness of such diffuse 
regulatory regimes? Abbott and Snidal propose that regulatory 
processes occur in roughly five stages (although they do not 
always occur in an orderly fashion): Agenda-setting, Negotiation, 
Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement (a process they 
short-hand as “ANIME”).49 Truly effective regulatory schemes, 
they argue, must address all five stages.50 In addition, they 
explain that throughout these stages, the actors involved (states, 
firms, and NGOs) can exhibit four competencies to varying 
degrees at different stages: independence, representativeness, 
expertise, and operational capacity.51 All of these competencies 
— which vary in their importance depending on the stage of the 
ANIME process — are necessary, though not necessarily suf-
ficient, for a regime to be effective.52
In transnational settings, however, Abbott and Snidal argue 
that no single actor — even an advanced democracy — has the 
competencies required for effective regulation at all stages of 
the regulatory process.53 While different actors may develop 
additional competencies over time through hiring experts, 
employees or consultants, certain capacities are beyond both 
firms’ and NGOs’ reaches; for example, firms cannot be truly 
independent, but they can improve the perception and fact 
of their independence by hiring separate monitoring depart-
ments or enlisting external monitors.54 Given these limitations, 
Abbott and Snidal conclude that “single-actor schemes, whose 
competencies are primarily derived from their sponsors, are 
implausible as transnational regulators.”55 Accordingly, they 
argue that the “most promising strategy may be collaboration,” 
i.e., “assembling the needed competencies by bringing together 
actors of different types.”56
In this regard, even when states do not regulate directly, 
they can nonetheless play substantial roles indirectly by shap-
ing the bargaining among different actor groups that leads to the 
formation and shaping of transnational governance regimes.57 
A primary example of such indirect influence is in standard- 
setting by states and international organizations; standards 
“shape the expectations and normative understandings that guide 
other actors engaged in [regulatory standard setting].”58 They 
create levers by which NGOs hold firms accountable and focal 
points that simplify bargaining over the content of standards and 
reduce its cost.”59 Indeed, states and international organizations 
can even play an “entrepreneurial role[]” in “enhancing the com-
petencies and bargaining power of other actors and modifying 
the situational factors” relevant to the bargaining among actors.60
Despite the efforts by NGO-and-firm-based schemes to 
innovate and create their own standards, they often root these 
standards in state-generated norms or eventually return to 
international norms as benchmarks.61 This is primarily due to 
the legitimacy conferred by norms developed through state or 
inter-state processes. These actors’ representativeness almost 
certainly encompass a broader range of interest and preferences 
than do the narrow missions of either NGOs or firms, and thus, 
state-generated norms carry more legitimacy and by referring to 
or relying upon them, NGOs and firms can confer greater legiti-
macy on their regulatory schemes.62 The use of legitimate public 
standards also helps to shift the balance of power between firms 
and NGOs in the creation of regulatory schemes: by relying 
on the more legitimate state-based standards, NGOs make it 
harder for firms to resist their demands. This is clearly what has 
occurred with respect to the relationships among the IFC, the 
Equator Principle Financial Institutions (“EPFIs”), and NGOs, 
although in complex ways.
The equaTor prInCIples’ eFFeCTIveness
AgendA-setting, negotiAtion And imPlementAtion
All of the relevant actor groups — the Equator Principle 
banks, the IFC and the NGO community have been instrumental 
in agenda-setting, negotiation of the applicable standards and 
implementation of more sustainable practices by private actors. 
Between 2004 and 2006, the EPFIs and NGOs participated in 
the IFC’s review and update of its Performance Standards.63 
When in February 2006 the IFC adopted its new Performance 
Standards, the EPFIs conducted a further consultation from 
March to May 2006 with NGOs, clients, industry associations, 
and export credit agencies which led to the substantially revised 
Equator Principles II (“EPII”), also based on the IFC’s updated 
Performance Standards.64 EPII launched on July 6, 2006, at 
which time forty institutions re-adopted the EPs. The most 
important revisions in EPII arguably made them much more 
effective than they were previously. These changes included 
lowering the project cost threshold from fifty to ten million;65 
the extension of the EPs to banks’ advisory activities;66 and 
the inclusion of upgrades and expansions of existing projects 
(including those not built under EP review) under the regime’s 
coverage.67 Perhaps the most important change was the EPs’ 
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first set of “teeth,” Equator Principle 10, which established the 
requirement to report annually on progress and performance and 
more robust public consultation standards.68 When the IFC later 
updated its Environmental Health and Safety Guidelines in April 
2007, the EPFIs incorporated this revision into the EPs as well.69
The resulting ten Equator Principles correspond loosely to 
the various phases of the project finance lending cycle, which also 
relate to the banks’ project development cycle. The first phase is 
the lender’s due diligence (EPs 1, 2, 3, & 7), which occurs dur-
ing the pre-construction activities of project design and permit-
ting.70 The second phase is loan negotiation and documentation 
(Principles 4 & 8).71 The third phase is portfolio management 
(Principle 9), which correlates with project implementation.72 
The disclosure, consultation, and grievance mechanism require-
ments (Principle 5 and 6) may apply throughout the lending 
cycle, depending on the anticipated extent of impacts on local 
communities.73 All requirements flow from the first Principle 
1, EP1 on the categorization of projects, which dictates that 
borrowers categorize projects as either Category A (projects with 
potential significant adverse social or environmental impacts 
that are diverse, irreversible or unprecedented), Category B 
(projects with potential limited adverse social or environmental 
impacts that are few in number, generally site-specific, largely 
reversible and readily addressed through mitigation measures), 
or Category C (projects with minimal or no social or environ-
mental impacts).74
According to Equator Principles 3, the choice of the stan-
dards or law applicable to project risk review and mitigation 
depends on the categorization of the project: when develop-
ing projects in high-income Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) countries, borrowers’ 
environmental and social risk assessment must comply only 
with national law.75 When developing projects in low-income 
or non-OECD countries, the IFC’s Performance Standards are 
the applicable environmental and social standards governing 
project risk assessment and mitigation.76 However, even in high-
income countries, national law is not necessarily an ironclad 
guarantee against problem projects. Regardless, when a project 
is being developed in an emerging market context, i.e., a non-
OECD country or low-income OECD country, the EPs insist 
that project sponsors also take into account the International 
Financial Corporation’s Performance Standards on Social and 
Environmental Sustainability, which include detailed environ-
mental and social assessment policies and procedures related to 
specific thematic areas, each of which is interpreted by Guidance 
Notes.77 In addition to the Performance Standards, the EPs also 
reference the World Bank’s Environmental, Health and Safety 
(“EHS”) Guidelines, which identify specific performance levels 
and technical guidance for sixty-three sectors.78
Shortly after the launch of the EP Association in June 2010, 
the EPs underwent a seven month-long Strategic Review led 
by external consultants that overlapped in time with the IFC’s 
comprehensive overhaul of its Performance Standards.79 The EP 
Association offered a response to the Strategic Review, but now 
that the 2011 revision of the IFC Performance Standards has 
been finalized, the EP Association has incorporated the revised 
Performance Standards and has launched a further complete 
update — towards Equator Principles III — to be completed by 
late-2012.80
Thus, in the two substantial updates of the IFC Performance 
Standards, the EPFIs — as the most common end-users of the 
Performance Standards (“PS”), played an unusually large role 
in shaping their evolution.81 Furthermore, any changes to the PS 
will almost certainly have to be accepted and incorporated writ 
large by the EPFIs now that they have relied on the PS for their 
normative content for over seven years.82 Arguably the linkage 
to the IFC’s Performance Standards caused the EPs to “ratchet-
up” their requirements more quickly than they might otherwise 
have done if the banks were only facing-off against their NGO 
interlocutors, which could have led to more of an entrenched 
stalemate than already has emerged at times. From this perspec-
tive, the first few EPFIs certainly achieved one of their purported 
goals in forming the EPs, namely, to have a seat at the table when 
discussion of standards occur in the project finance sector. The 
EPs have also taken on the role of global standard-bearer in ways 
that complement the IFC’s own efforts: the EP banks “coordi-
nate closely” with the IFC on outreach activities in the emerging 
markets,83 which according to an IFC staffer, allows the IFC to 
extend its reach with commercial banks in those regions more 
easily. This collaboration has at times been read in different ways 
as well by the NGOs: according to Banktrack, the EPFIs had 
used the ongoing PS review as a justification for inaction on 
certain issues.84 Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the trian-
gulated efforts of these actors has contributed to the formation 
and proliferation of the EPs.85
monitoRing And enfoRcement
Although the EPs have dramatically changed the regulatory 
landscape of global project investment and development, like 
any regulatory regime, they are far from perfect. From the start 
there were concerns that the EP regime did not go far enough in 
meeting the ideals expressed in the Collevecchio Declaration.86 
In the months following the creation of the EPs (January 2004), a 
new coalition of NGOs — Banktrack — formed to monitor sus-
tainability practices in the financial sector.87 Banktrack quickly 
designated itself as a watchdog of the EPFIs, releasing report 
after report analyzing the banks’ implementation and apparent 
commitment levels.88 Banktrack later devoted a special section 
of its website to featuring “dodgy deals,” serving as a clearing-
house for information on controversial projects, including NGO 
activities and complaints as well as an opportunity for banks to 
respond to concerns.89 It must be emphasized, however, that the 
NGOs’ ability to perform this function — which some suggest 
they do only reluctantly — is impeded by the EPFIs’ unwilling-
ness thus far to do more extensive project-level disclosure.90
The NGOs’ complaints about the Equator Principles have 
remained fairly constant from the start, although some of them 
have been addressed partially or completely by the EPFIs, lead-
ing the perceived legitimacy of the regime to wax and wane over 
time — at least in the eyes of their NGO interlocutors.91 Indeed, 
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the long-standing relations between the EPFIs and the Banktrack 
network of NGOs reached its lowest point in early 2010 when 
the NGOs announced a boycott of the EPFIs’ large annual meet-
ings at which the NGOs had become regular participants.92 
Banktrack stated that they no longer believed these large annual 
meetings to be productive fora for advancing their objectives 
and announced that they would not participate in them until real 
progress was made by the EPFIs.93
The major persisting criticisms in the NGOs’ eyes are the 
EPs’ insufficient transparency on the project, institution, and 
regime levels;94 and the related lack of an independent monitor-
ing, verification, or enforcement mechanism.95 NGOs are also 
dissatisfied with the EP’s insufficient project level grievance 
mechanisms,96 particularly their limited scope of application 
only to project finance transactions as opposed to all project-
related transactions regardless of financing structure97 and their 
failure to proactively address climate change.98 It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to address these complaints in depth, but 
it suffices to note that whether the NGO community likes it or 
not,99 they have assumed the role of policemen and in the pro-
cess, have created a kind of uneasy alliance — a quasi hybrid 
governance scheme, demonstrating the wisdom of Abbott and 
Snidal’s insight that to achieve effective governance the best 
strategy might be collaboration and “assembling” the various 
competencies of different actors.
indePendence, RePResentAtiveness, exPeRtise,  
And oPeRAtionAl cAPAcity.
Looking more closely at the four competencies described 
by Abbott and Snidal, we see that if we broadly construe 
the activities of governance related to project finance in the 
private sector, the EPs do have most of the competencies covered, 
particularly if its supporting governance actors — the NGOs 
and the IFC — are included as part of the “governance” 
structure, or “triangle.”100
Representativeness. Though both NGOs’ and banks’ 
representativeness would ordinarily be subject to some criti-
cism,101 this is offset somewhat by the inclusion of the IFC — a 
multilateral institution with over 140 Member States — and its 
significant influence on both standard-setting and ongoing assis-
tance in technical advisory services and outreach.102 Although 
true representativeness, one that would include the views of 
impacted populations, is far from being achieved, the most 
recent revision of the Performance Standards took considerable 
steps in this direction, and the EPs may very well follow suit.
Operational Capacity and Expertise. The EPFIs provide 
sufficient operational capacity individually and are continually 
ramping-up their collective capacity and resources. Originally the 
“Management Structure” consisted of the Steering Committee 
members (about a dozen banks) and a modest secretariat staff (of 
one person) that divided-up the work of administering, strength-
ening, and growing the EP regime.103 This governance structure 
includes subcommittees known as Working Groups that focus 
on various substantive aspects of maintaining and enhancing 
the EP regime, including Working Groups on (a) adoption, (b) 
best practice, (c) climate change, (d) outreach (divided again by 
region), (e) scope review — corporate loans, (f) scope review 
— export finance, (g) social risks, (h) stakeholders — NGOs, 
(i) stakeholders — socially responsible investment, and (j) 
stakeholders — industry outreach.104
Responding once more to NGO concerns, in July 2010 the 
EPFIs launched the “Equator Principles Association,” a legally 
binding governance structure complete with bylaws, voting 
mechanisms, membership dues.105 This enhanced formaliza-
tion also responded in part to another of the NGOs’ concerns, 
as it introduced a de-listing procedure for removing EPFIs who 
are not compliant with the annual reporting requirement in EP 
10.106 With the launch of the Association, the EPs have drasti-
cally improved their operational capacity, as they now collect 
membership dues and have formal rules to govern their relations 
with one another.107 Nevertheless, there remains much room for 
improvement.
Independence. While the independence of the EP 
Association from its individual members remains an open ques-
tion, this, along with the issues of monitoring and enforcement, 
are being counter-balanced by persistent NGO monitoring, 
engagement and activism (and, on project-specific issues, inde-
pendence is increased by EP 7’s requirement that on Category 
A and B projects the banks must hire an external independent 
consultant).108
In sum, when viewed in isolation, the EPs can be charac-
terized as fitting Abbott and Snidal’s positive model predicting 
that single-actor governance schemes will provide only modest 
self-regulation; the newly-formed EP Association has some of 
the competencies described as necessary by Abbott and Snidal 
(expertise, operational capacity, and some representative-
ness), while primarily lacking demonstrated independence.109 
Arguably, however, this is to take too myopic a view of the over-
all “governance triangle” operating with respect to the project 
finance sector. When the combined effects of the IFC and 
NGOs are included a different picture emerges with the vari-
ous actor groups collectively providing all four competencies, 
albeit imperfectly and in an ever-evolving schema of hesitant 
collaboration.
ConClusIon: FInanCIers as  
seTTIng The susTaInabIlITy agenda
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the EPs’ growth and 
development is the way in which they have made themselves an 
indispensible party to future debates on sustainable development 
and the specific articulation of standards key to economic growth 
— the IFC’s Performance Standards. Such developments are not 
limited to the EPs, however. In fact, there have been signs that 
the financial sector is assuming a considerably more active role 
in directing the global governance of their own activities, and by 
extension, much of the global economy. For example, leading 
into renewed climate negotiations in Cancun in late 2010, 259 
investors from Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe Latin America 
and North America with collective assets under management 
totaling over $15 trillion110 called for governments to take action 
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on climate change. These investors were not necessarily united 
by their passion for the environment, but more likely by their 
realization of the financial risks related to climate change, which 
they claimed could amount to GDP losses of up to 20 percent by 
2050, as well as the economic benefits of shifting to low-carbon 
and resource-efficient economies.111
Similarly, in 2005 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
helped launch the Principles for Responsible Investment.112 Not 
unlike the EPs, the PRI provide guidance to investors in how 
to integrate issues of environmental and social governance into 
their investment policies. As of April 2012 over 1000 investment 
institutions from over 45 countries have become signatories, 
with assets under management equaling approximately US$ 30 
trillion.113 A particularly active group of PRI signatories have 
in fact turned-up the pressure on the largest but also most criti-
cized114 U.N.-sponsored initiative — the Global Compact, which 
has more than 10,000 participants, including over 7,000 busi-
nesses in 140 countries, although over 3,100 companies have 
already been expelled for noncompliance and 750 are expected 
to be expelled in the second half of 2012.115 In January of 2008, 
a coalition of 38 investors worth over US$ 3 trillion wrote letters 
to the CEOs of 130 major listed companies that are signatories 
of the UN Global Compact.116 In their letters the investors 
praised twenty-five Global Compact signatories for meet-
ing their obligations under the Compact to produce an annual 
“Communication on Progress,” but simultaneously identified 
over 100 other companies as “laggards,” who were mainly based 
in emerging markets, and demanding them to comply with their 
obligations.117 The investors pointed out that they represented 
a “critical mass of institutional investors who believe manage-
ment of corporate responsibility or [Environmental, Social and 
Governance] issues is highly relevant to the long-term financial 
success of their investments” and that the Compact’s reporting 
system provided an important measure of companies’ perfor-
mance on these issues.118
The NGOs’ ‘nudges’ continue to have some impact, even 
if the progress is slower than they might wish. In the absence 
of coordinated multilateral action from governments on climate 
change, the NGOs and the EP Strategic Review called upon 
the EPs to adopt policies addressing the issue.119 A few banks 
have responded by separately creating the Carbon Principles, 
which aim “to provide a consistent approach for banks and their 
U.S. power clients to evaluate and address carbon risks in the 
financing of electric power projects” and in the process have 
articulated a set of Principles and an “Enhanced Environmental 
Due Diligence Process” to help create industry best practice in 
the energy sector in the United States.120 In addition, the EPFIs, 
in collaboration with the World Wildlife Fund and the Business 
and Biodiversity Offsets Program, has launched “B4B” — the 
Biodiversity for Banks program — which is “designed to help 
financial institutions overcome the challenges of incorporating 
risks associated with biodiversity and ecosystem services — 
all of the valuable resources provided by nature including safe 
drinking water — into their lending decisions.”121
The initiation of these conversations among financiers on 
climate change and biodiversity — and the demands on compa-
nies from investors for real improvement, not just lip service on 
these issues — offer a glimpse of what we might see at Rio+20’s 
Corporate Sustainability Forum.122 Unlike the first Rio Earth 
Summit, which was driven principally by government nego-
tiation and attended by NGOs,123 the Corporate Sustainability 
Forum provides a unique opportunity for the private sector — 
and financiers and investors in particular — to set the sustain-
ability agenda for the next twenty years.
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Information and technology transfer to China and India 
through compulsory licensing offers a unique opportunity 
to exploit the benefits of international trade to promote an 
environmentally sustainable future. However, international 
cooperation at the Rio+20 conference will be crucial in promot-
ing this opportunity by finally dealing with the issue of how 
to maintain intellectual property rights while disseminating 
the benefits of these technologies. While methods to mitigate 
short-term economic costs should be considered, Rio+20 must 
recognize the promise that compulsory licensing holds for 
reducing emissions in the long run and acknowledge the urgent 
need to make green technology available to the developing world 
at an affordable price.
